FM 7-98
OPERATIONS IN A LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT
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PREFACE
This manual provides tactical-level guidance to brigade and battalion commanders and staff officers for planning, controlling, and coordinating combined arms operations in a low-intensity environment. This doctrine was derived from approved operational concepts. It contains tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting brigade and battalion operations within each category of LIC.
This manual is for use by training developers as a source document for the combat critical tasks and missions of units operating in a low-intensity environment. It serves as a primary reference for both resident and nonresident LIC instruction presented to pre-commissioned, commissioned, and noncommissioned officers.

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Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

"For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill."

Sun Tzu

The possibility of US troops becoming involved in a low-intensity conflict (LIC) is ever increasing. This manual provides the framework for understanding LIC at the battalion and brigade levels to include the definition and nature of LIC, the military's role, imperatives, and operational categories. It also provides leadership considerations that affect low-intensity operations.

Section I. BACKGROUND
LIC is a politico-military confrontation between contending states or groups. It is below general war and above routine peaceful competition. It often involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. LIC ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economical, informational, and military instruments. LICs are often localized, usually in the Third World, but they contain regional and global security implications.

1-1. NATURE OF LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT
The four instruments of national power are political, economical, informational, and military. LICs are politically dominated. Within the operational continuum, LIC overlaps peacetime competition, conflict, and war. The US goal is to maintain or return to routine peaceful competition and to allow for the development of democracy within the free world. This manual focuses on tactical units' tasks and missions across the operational continuum just short of declared war.

1-2. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
LIC is an environment that is characterized by the pursuit of national objectives in a political dimension. The military supports the political, economical, and informational instruments of national power. Military operations conducted in the LIC environment are also influenced by the physical and social environments in which they occur.

1-3. MILITARY ROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT
Military operations in LIC are normally joint in nature and are characterized by the indirect versus direct application of force.

a) The Army role in LIC is identified in JCS Pub 3-07 and FM 100-20. The president sets policy, the CINC establishes how to implement those policies operationally, and the commanders on the ground establish how to execute them tactically. Unit contingency plans call for units to deploy to various locations and to conduct tactical operations, which have the potential to change from peace or conflict to war. However, the US intent in LIC is to protect and advance its national interests without recourse of war.

b) The role of brigades and battalions across the operational continuum presents a unique challenge. No matter what parameters have been established for the use of force, a disciplined unit, with soldiers proficient at individual skills who are operating under a clear expression of the commander's intent, can perform successfully at the tactical level in this environment.

c) Soldiers must be prepared to operate in a variety of geographical conditions--from jungles and mountains to deserts and cities. These conditions, coupled with extremes in weather, can have a significant affect on operations. The language, religious, and cultural differences between our society and those that soldiers may come in contact with pose additional challenges. The basic values and beliefs that are common to US soldiers are not universally embraced. Also, the continuing growth of urban environments throughout the world makes operations in built-up areas significant in all types of human conflicts.
Section II. IMPERATIVES
The tenets of Air Land Battle doctrine characterize successful conventional military operations and apply equally in LIC. Success in LIC requires planning and conduct of operations based on the following imperatives.

1-4. POLITICAL DOMINANCE
Political objectives affect military operations in conventional war. In LIC operations, they drive military decisions at every level—from the strategic to the tactical. All commanders and staff officers must understand these political objectives and the effect of military operations on them. They must adopt courses of action that legally support those objectives even if the courses of action are beyond traditional doctrine. For this reason, the planning and mission data analysis process in LIC should use the factors of METT-T with considerations to political factors.

1-5. UNITY OF EFFORT
Military leaders must integrate their efforts with both military and civilian organizations of the US and of countries we support to gain a mutual advantage in LIC. Military planners must consider how their actions contribute to initiatives that are also political, economical, and psychological in nature. Unity of effort calls for interagency, integration and cooperation. This permits effective action within our governmental system. Commanders may answer to civilian chiefs or may employ the resources of civilian agencies.

1-6. ADAPTABILITY
Adaptability is the ability and willingness to change or modify structures or methods to accommodate different situations. It requires careful mission analysis, comprehensive intelligence, and regional expertise. Adaptability is more than just tailoring or flexibility, which implies use of the same techniques in different situations. Successful military operations in LIC require the Armed Forces to use adaptability, not only to modify existing methods and structures but also to develop new ones for each situation.

1-7. LEGITIMACY
Legitimacy is the acceptance of the government’s right to govern or of a group or agency to enforce decisions. It is neither tangible nor easily quantifiable. Popular votes do not always confer or reflect legitimacy. Legitimacy comes from the idea that authority is genuine and effective, and it uses proper agencies for good purposes. No group or force can create legitimacy itself, but it can encourage and sustain legitimacy by its actions. Legitimacy is the central concern of all parties directly involved in a conflict.

1-8. PERSEVERANCE
LICs rarely have a clear beginning or ending marked by decisive actions that end in victory. They are, by nature, protracted struggles. Even those short, sharp contingency encounters that do occur are better assessed in the context of their contribution to long-term objectives. Perseverance is critical to success but does not preclude taking decisive action. It requires careful, informed analysis to select the right time and place for action. Perseverance helps commanders reject minor, short-term successes in favor of actions in pursuit of long-term goals. These imperatives apply in all four LIC operational categories (see Section III).

Section III. OPERATIONAL CATEGORIES
Military operations in LIC are divided into four operational categories. This section identifies the types of operations and roles of maneuver units within each category.

1-9. SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY
US security interests may lie with an incumbent government or with an insurgency. The objective in insurgency is to overthrow the legally constituted government through subversion and armed conflict. In counterinsurgency (COIN), the objective is for the host government to defeat an insurgency through military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic action. (See Chapter 2.)

1-10. COMBATING TERRORISM
The aim of combating terrorism is to protect installations, units, and individuals from the threat of terrorism. Combating terrorism includes both antiterrorism and counter terrorism actions throughout the
operational continuum (see Chapter 3). The program provides coordinated action before, during, and after terrorist incidents.

1-11. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
PKOs are military operations that maintain peace already obtained through diplomatic efforts. A peacekeeping force supervises and implements a negotiated truce to which belligerent parties have agreed. The force operates strictly within the parameters of its terms of reference (TORs). Normally, the peacekeeping force is forbidden to use force, except for self-defense. (See Chapter 4.)

1-12. PEACETIME CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
PCOs include such diverse actions as disaster relief; counter-narcotic operations; and land, sea, and air strikes. The unifying feature of these actions is the rapid mobilization of effort to focus on a specific problem, usually in a crisis. PCOs are guided at the national level by the crisis action system. (See JCS Pub 5-02.4.) Often, these operations take place away from customary facilities. They require deep penetration and temporary establishment of long lines of communication (LOC) in a hostile environment. PCOs may require restraint in the use of force or concentrated violent actions. (See Chapter 5.)

Section IV. LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES
Leaders must contend with disorientation caused by different cultures and values, unfamiliar and discomforting levels of poverty, uncertainty of purpose, and problems in identifying the enemy. The nature of the conflict requires restraint in the use of force. However, soldiers may be subject to severe provocation or the threat of death from the most unlikely sources at the most unlikely times. Leaders must also exert a positive influence when they do not have formal authority --for example, the need to rely on persuasion in dealing with foreign forces, other US Government agencies, or non governmental organizations and individuals.

1-13. FORCE PROTECTION
Force protection is a critical issue that is further complicated in the LIC environment.
   a. Restrictions on the conduct of operations and the use of force must be clearly explained and understood by all echelons. Soldiers must understand that their actions, no matter how minor, may have far-reaching effects. Reasons for this may include treating the population with respect and courtesy, which is an important part of the intercultural preparation. Any action can be exploited rapidly, by both friendly and enemy media and PSYOP efforts. Commanders must always consider the aspects of force protection and how it relates to established ROE.
   b. Winning the information fight is often an overlooked aspect. Language is a special consideration for all operations, whether interfacing with the established governmental agencies or with the populace. Considerations for the exchange of information in combined or unilateral operations must be examined. During decentralized operations, the ability to communicate with different agencies and the local populace helps in protecting the force.

1-14. FORCE SUSTAINMENT
   The ability of friendly forces to sustain themselves in undeveloped areas and the support provided to and received from a host country are unique. Familiar support bases may not always be available. Locally procured support may not be suitable for US forces, and its provision may deprive the host country of scarce resources needed for its own use. Small US units often operate independently. To provide a logistic base on the scene would elevate total US military presence; however, this may not be acceptable.

1-15. DISCIPLINE MAINTENANCE
Disciplined soldiers are vital to the successful performance of US forces in LIC. They must observe the ROE while coping with the stress of daily operations. Soldiers must adjust psychologically to enemy operations, which may include acts of terrorism, and must display acceptable practices to the local populace.

1-16. FRATRICIDE PREVENTION
The overriding consideration in any tactical operation is the accomplishment of the mission. Commanders must consider fratricide in their planning process because of the decentralized nature of execution in the LIC environment. However, they must weigh the risk of fratricide against losses to enemy fire when
considering a given course of action. Fratricide is prevented by adhering to the following:

a. Doctrine. Doctrine provides the basic framework for accomplishment of the mission. Commanders must have a thorough understanding of US, joint, and host nation doctrine.

b. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. TTPs provide a "how to" that personnel at all levels understand. They are disseminated in doctrinal manuals and SOPs.

(1) Planning. A simple, flexible maneuver plan that is disseminated to the lowest level of command aids in the prevention of fratricide. Plans should include the maximum use of SOPs and battle drills at the user level. They should incorporate adequate control measures, and fire support planning and coordination to ensure the safety of friendly troops.

(2) Execution. The execution of the plan must be monitored with regard to the location of friendly troops and their relationship to friendly fires. Subordinate units must understand the importance of reporting their positions. Company and battalion commanders must know the location of their troops at all times. They must exercise positive control, particularly when employing artillery, mortars, and helicopter and air strikes.

c. Training. Individual and collective training contain many tasks that support operations in LIC. Well-trained soldiers know their capabilities and limitations. Training is the most important sector in preventing fratricide. Training is supported by--

(1) Situational awareness. Well-trained soldiers can accomplish routine tasks instinctively. This allows them to focus on what is happening around them; they can "see" the battlefield. They maintain an awareness of the relative location of enemy and friendly personnel.

(2) Rehearsal. Rehearsal is training for the mission at hand. Commanders at every level must plan time for this critical task.
CHAPTER 2
SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

"I have sworn eternal hostility against every form of tyranny over the mind of man."
Thomas Jefferson

The US may assist either a government or an insurgent force that is operating against a government. Once committed, brigades and battalion task forces (both heavy and light) augmented by SOF serve as the "cutting edge" of the joint task force (JTF) in both insurgency and COIN operations. To be successful, the commander must understand the insurgent as well as his specific role in COIN. This chapter discusses insurgency operations; the tactical maneuver commander's role in COIN operations in both offensive and defensive roles; and tactics, techniques and procedures for conducting COIN operations in all three phases of an insurgency. Normally, US forces will not be committed until Phase III of the insurgency. (See paragraph 2-6.)

Section I. THE NATURE OF INSURGENCY
Insurgents must be understood before they can be defeated. This section discusses the characteristics, tactics, and environment of insurgency operations. An insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. The members of the insurgent force are organized along political lines to support political, economic, social, military, psychological, and covert operations. The military or paramilitary arm of insurgencies normally use guerrilla warfare tactics. This is characterized by offensive action at the time and place of the guerrilla's choosing. This happens when the guerrilla can develop local superiority, relying on evasion rather than defensive combat for protection. Along with overt actions, an insurgency can be characterized by strikes, demonstrations, propaganda, political organization, and diplomacy.

2-1. GOALS
The initial goal of the insurgent movement is to replace the established government. The insurgent accomplishes this by--

a. Gaining support for the insurgent movement through humanitarian aid programs, propaganda, coercion, and terror. If he cannot gain active support, then he seeks passive support. Silence on the part of the populace, concerning insurgent activities, is passive support for the insurgent.

b. Using guerrilla warfare--
   (1) To increase the population's vulnerability through the use of selective terrorism. The guerrilla attacks or destroys economic and political symbols upon which the government is founded. Overreaction by government forces or other authorities adds to the population's resentment toward the government and its support to the insurgency.
   (2) To reduce government control. The guerrilla defeats small government forces and strikes where government forces are not located. This adds to the perception that the government cannot or will not provide security for the population and its property. In turn, this adds to the perception that the government cannot control the insurgents.
   (3) To provide psychological victories. The guerrilla wants victories that psychologically benefit the insurgent movement. These victories may not be key in terms of material damage to the government or its armed forces. What the guerrilla seeks is a psychological advantage.
   (4) To block government resources. The guerrillas seek to block or redirect resources that the government is trying to use in development programs.
   (5) To weaken the resolve of government military forces. By defeating smaller elements of the government's military forces, the guerrilla further weakens limited assets. He also psychologically weakens the government forces' resolve to continue waging war.

2-2. ENVIRONMENT
The environment in which the insurgent operates must be examined from more than a geographical point of view. While terrain and climate are important factors, the political, economical, and sociological environments are vital.

a. Terrain. The guerrilla prefers to continue to live in his own home. He lives in camps if security does not permit him to live at home. The preferred camps are chosen for easy access to the target population, access to a friendly or neutral border, good escape routes, and good observation of approach routes used by government COIN forces. When COIN operations force the guerrilla out of his base camps, he sets up camps in rugged, unfriendly areas that are not easily penetrated by government forces.

b. Climate. The insurgent has an advantage since he is usually a native to the area and is accustomed to the climate. If government forces are familiar with the same climate, then the advantage is reduced.

c. Political Factors. The amount of government control in an area directly affects the ability of the insurgent to operate. The more government control, the less successful are insurgent activities. The insurgent will attempt to establish a shadow government, to disrupt normal government functions, and to destroy key government facilities and personnel. The level of government control in an area is reduced as the shadow government assumes those functions previously held by the legitimate government.

d. Economic Factors. Low standards of living and desires for economic reforms may be popular causes of resentment toward the government’s economic policies. This enhances the insurgent’s chances for success. The insurgent seeks to exploit this situation through the use of PSYOP. The insurgent obtains most of his logistic support from the local economy, which he normally will not disrupt. Insurgent forces can destroy a local economy as a "lesson" to the populace for obtaining support or obedience.

e. Sociological Factors. The more fragmented a society, the greater the chance for resentment by the populace. The insurgent attempts to increase friction between different groups in society. These groups may be aligned along racial, ethnic, religious, or social lines. Language differences or tradition can also be a reason for alignment. Religious influences can play a major role in the sociological factors that affect the insurgent. The effect each factor has on the insurgent and his ability to operate changes with each situation. The commander's analysis of each factor helps determine what the effect will be before conducting COIN operations. Therefore, all factors must be analyzed to determine their weaknesses and strengths in relation to the insurgent. In planning for COIN operations, the commander exploits disclosed insurgent weaknesses and deprives the insurgent of any opportunity to exploit government weaknesses.

2-3. CHARACTERISTICS

By understanding the characteristics of the insurgent, the commander can determine strengths that must be reduced or avoided and weaknesses that can be exploited. The characteristics discussed in this paragraph provide a base to analyze the specific threat. No two insurgencies are the same; therefore, the commander planning COIN operations must analyze a specific situation to discover how characteristics apply.

a. Insurgent Strengths. Insurgents typically have many strengths that must be reduced.

(1) Intelligence. The intelligence networks in the insurgent infrastructure usually provide continuous and current information on government force dispositions, strengths, weaknesses, and abilities. The need for secrecy as an element of survival for the insurgent organization makes it hard for the government to penetrate and disrupt its forces. Early intelligence collection and analysis must be aggressive to build an effective data base. Pattern analysis and other techniques can remove such an advantage from the insurgent. COIN forces can also overcome this intelligence advantage through the use of deception, OPSEC, and COMSEC.

(2) Indigenous characteristics. Insurgents can blend with the local populace since they are usually part of it. This enhances their ability to operate with secrecy. The COIN force must identify the insurgent and remove him from the civilian populace. This is best accomplished through the use of population and resources controls. Civilians must not be injured or mistreated due to COIN operations.

(3) Knowledge. The insurgent’s knowledge of the local populace and terrain is an advantage. It gives him the ability to employ PSYOP effectively through coercion of the local population. The COIN force must overcome this advantage by fostering a strong relationship between the...
government forces and the populace. The insurgent's advantage can be overcome by continuous COIN operations from a permanently stationed native COIN force and by skillful employment of these assets. This force consists of personnel from the local populace.

4. Motivation and discipline. The insurgent leaders are trained and motivated. They reinforce motivation within the insurgent force by applying discipline. Usually, the insurgent is strongly devoted to a cause.

5. Limited responsibilities. The insurgent is not usually responsible for maintaining normal governmental obligations toward society. This frees all his efforts to conduct operations in support of the insurgency goals. However, he may be tasked to perform certain political services (such as tax collection) by the insurgency shadow government.

6. Tactics. The insurgent can employ a broad range of tactics—from terror and sabotage through conventional warfare. This enables him to escalate or deescalate antigovernment activity almost at will. Time is not a factor for the insurgent; he will take all the time necessary to do a thorough reconnaissance before any action.

7. Physical condition. One of the major advantages the insurgent has is his ability to endure hardship. Due to the situation, he must survive with less, forcing him to adapt and be innovative.

b. Insurgent Weaknesses. Insurgents have some weaknesses that can be exploited.

1. Limited personnel and resource. Difficulty in personnel recruitment and resupply of material can limit his operations. The COIN force should exploit these weaknesses by interdicting supply routes and facilities, by forcing desertion due to hardships, and by inflicting combat losses.

2. Individual factors. The insurgent often endures a life of physical danger and privation. These stresses can be exploited by COIN forces. Stress factors include numerical inferiority to government forces, fear of being treated as a criminal if captured, and fear of violence to himself and his family. Other stress factors are combat and a hostile environment that weaken insurgent resolve. In some societies, good treatment, pardon, protection, food, shelter, and participation in the government may be stronger incentives than the fear of criminal punishment to induce desertions.

3. Operational factors. Operational weaknesses may include security, which requires many resources and slows responsiveness. The insurgent's dependence on popular support is also a weakness. If support waivers or is withdrawn, the insurgent cannot operate effectively. Another potential operational weakness is the lack of sophisticated communications. This requires the insurgent to spend much time in preparing an operation. Political, religious, and ethnic differences among insurgent groups can be major exploitable weaknesses.

2-4. POPULAR AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT
Support is a major concern common to all insurgents. It can be divided into two categories: popular and logistic.

a. Popular Support. As discussed, the insurgent must have either the active or passive support of the populace to succeed. Popular support alone will not ensure the success of insurgent operations. Ineffective operations, unwise decisions, and poor leadership could preclude his success.

(1) Some form of popular support should exist for the insurgent to initiate and conduct operations. If popular support does not exist or is withdrawn, the insurgent cannot conduct operations with any hope of success. Therefore, one of the prime considerations for the COIN force is to gain and maintain the support of the populace. Areas where active support is given to the insurgent are good targets for PSYOP. Populace and resource control operations are major factors in removing support for the insurgent.

(2) In areas where only passive support is given to the insurgent, government efforts through PSYOP and CA, as well as security provisions, must be initiated to gain active support and trust of the government. In areas that the government controls and where the populace supports the government, the government emphasizes the four major operations in IDAD (balanced development, security, neutrality, and mobilization) to maintain that support.

b. Logistic Support. This support is one of the insurgent's greatest weaknesses. In early operations, he
relies on his base of popular support for logistic requirements. As the insurgent force develops and expands, its logistic needs may increase beyond the abilities of the internal support base. If overall goals for the insurgent movement are not imminent, the insurgent may need extra logistic support from another source.

(1) If the insurgent receives support from external sources, the problem of security exists for supply lines, transport means, and storage facilities. External support should not be considered a prerequisite to begin COIN operations. It is an added factor that enhances the abilities of the insurgent. The COIN force should seek to interdict the logistic support network of the insurgent force, whether it is internal or external.

(2) Since insurgent tactics operate along military lines, insurgents usually have temporary sites for headquarters, installations, facilities, and operational units. These temporary sites are called base camps. In these camps, the insurgent has his command posts, training areas, communications facilities, medical stations, and logistics centers. He may also use these camps for rest, retraining, and re-equipping.

(3) The base camps are not the same as conventional force operational bases. These bases are kept small, and usually there is more than one base in the insurgent's area of operation. Characteristics of a base camp area are as follows:

(a) Cover and concealment. The insurgent tries to locate base camps in areas where cover and concealment provide security against detection.

(b) Rough, inaccessible terrain. The insurgent chooses terrain that may restrict the government's mobility and employment of heavy weapons. While the insurgent avoids defensive combat, he emphasizes short-term defensive action in the base camp area to aid evacuation. To preclude accidental discovery, the insurgent is not near inhabited areas. However, because he must fulfill his logistic needs, his base camp should be no more than one day's march from a village or town. The COIN force must locate and disrupt these camps to keep the insurgent off balance, allowing the COIN force to gain the initiative.

(c) Suitable for bivouac. The insurgent chooses an area suitable for bivouac. He must consider food and water supply, grade or slope of terrain, access to trails, and protective environment.

2-5. GUERRILLA TACTICS

Guerrilla warfare is one characteristic of an insurgency. The guerrilla is the combat element to the insurgency. When guerrilla forces first become operational, they usually engage in limited or small-scale operations. If they reach more sophisticated levels of organization, equipment, and training, larger operations using more conventional tactics may be expected. Insurgent tactics are characterized by elusiveness, surprise, and brief, violent action. These tactics in the early phases can be divided into two areas: terrorism and harassment.

a. Terrorism. The guerrilla can use terrorism to accomplish his goals. Terrorist techniques include bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, threats, mutilation, murder, torture, and blackmail. Not all guerrillas use terrorism as a tool. If terrorism is used, it is usually for coercion or intimidation. Terrorism may also be used to discredit the government by provoking the government into overreactions that alienate the populace or demonstrate its inability to protect them.

(1) Coercion. This persuades individuals to act favorably in given situations toward the guerrilla or insurgent movement—for example, to persuade a local mayor to revise policy concerning the guerrilla or to gain passive support while at the same time redirecting resources to the insurgent movement.

(2) Intimidation. This modifies behavior. Usually, threats or fear of harm are used either toward the individual or his family and friends. Intimidation induces the populace to silence or non cooperation with government forces. It discourages competent citizens from accepting vital low-level government positions—for example, the killing of servicemen to encourage draft evasion.

b. Harassment. Harassment keeps government forces on the defensive. If successful, it causes government forces react to guerrilla operations. As a result, the government cannot conduct offensive
operations that would prevent successful guerrilla operations. Harassment also weakens the government's resources and disrupts lines of communication. One advantage of harassment is the image it presents of the guerrilla being able to strike anywhere. Also, the government appears ineffective and incompetent by constantly losing small battles. This affects the morale of the government force.

(1) Most guerrilla operations are offensive, not defensive. There is seldom an attempt to seize and defend objectives.

(2) The guerrilla uses infiltration during movements. However, near the target area, small guerrilla elements mass and then conduct operations. The most common techniques employed by the guerrilla are the ambush, raid, and small-scale attacks. These are usually targeted against security posts, small forces, facilities, and LOC.

(3) While government forces outnumber the guerrilla, the guerrilla seeks to attain local numerical superiority. Then, he can attain victory over small elements of the government forces. These tactics, if successful, compel government forces to commit larger elements to defensive tasks. Once government forces move to the defensive, they lose the initiative and become reactive. This allows the guerrilla time and space to develop so that he can engage larger government forces with more conventional tactics.

2-6. DEVELOPMENT PHASES

Once an insurgent organization is established and starts its activities, it progresses through phases in its effort to overthrow the government. The "mass-oriented" or Maoist organizational and operational pattern consists of three phases. A distinguishing characteristic of other patterns is that they forego one or more of these phases. The defending government cannot easily determine when the insurgency will move from one phase to another. The activities performed in the earlier phases continue through the later phases. These phases range from the weak insurgent movement to when the insurgent can directly confront government forces. Also, depending on the lack of success of the movement, a reversion may occur from Phase III to Phase II or even back to Phase I.

a. PHASE I: Latent and Incipient Insurgency. Activity in this phase ranges from subversive activity, which is only a potential threat, to situations where frequent subversive incidents and activities occur in a pattern. It involves no major outbreak of violence or uncontrolled insurgent activity. The insurgent force does not conduct continuous operations but rather selected acts of terrorism. An insurgency could achieve victory during this phase.

b. PHASE II: Guerrilla Warfare. This phase is reached when the insurgent movement, having gained enough local external support, initiates organized continuous guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the government. This is an attempt to force government forces into a defensive role. As the insurgent becomes stronger, he begins to conduct larger operations.

c. PHASE III: War of Movement. When the insurgent attains the force structure and ability to directly engage government forces in decisive combat, he begins to use more conventional tactics. He may also obtain combat forces from an external source. Also, the insurgent can begin conducting more extensive defensive operations to protect the areas he controls. The host nation's military plan and the US military support plan must be combined to govern US tactical operations. When the US employs combat forces, they are normally assigned missions that support the security component of the IDAD strategy. This allows the host nation to establish a secure base for mobilization and balanced development programs, and to form and train effective security forces. US forces may conduct offensive operations to disrupt and destroy the insurgents' combat formations or to interdict their external support. These operations can prevent the insurgents from undertaking actions against government-controlled areas. They can also disrupt the insurgents' efforts to consolidate and expand areas already under their control.

Section II. BRIGADE AND BATTALION TASK FORCE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

The COIN commander faces an enemy whose objectives, tactics, and concepts usually differ from his own. This section examines the role of tactical COIN operations in relation to the COIN program. Also,
it discusses planning and principles for the successful conduct of COIN operations, as well as related operations that the COIN force must know.

2-7. FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE AUGMENTATION FORCE OPERATIONS
TIDAF is the most common role in which US forces conduct COIN operations. It supports the host country’s national objectives and COIN plan. The TIDAF commander must consider the final goals of the host country COIN program and how to coordinate his operations to support those goals. (For additional information on TIDAF, see FM 100-20.)

a. Planning. Most US forces conducting COIN operations are part of a TIDAF. The commander must understand how TIDAF operations support the host country COIN plan. In this sense, the goals of the host country COIN plan become the goals for the TIDAF and the COIN commander. A major consideration when planning COIN operations is the effect operations will have on the populace. Commanders must try to win the active support of the population for the government. COIN activities must avoid incidents that the insurgent can exploit in his PSYOP.

b. Support of COIN. US forces committed to the TIDAF in the host country have a dual mission. They must assist the host nation forces to defeat or neutralize the insurgent militarily. This allows the host country government to start or resume functioning in once contested or insurgent-controlled areas. Also, US forces must support the overall COIN program by conducting non combat operations such as training, security assistance, intelligence, and tactical support. This provides an environment where the host country government can win the trust and support of its people and become self-sustaining. Both aspects of the COIN mission are of equal importance and must be conducted at the same time. A common mistake made by the TIDAF when trying to gain popular support is that the TIDAF sometimes wins popular support only for itself. The commander must ensure that popular support is for the host country government. Credit for successful campaigns against the insurgents, or programs to help the people, should go to the host country government.

2-8. CONDUCT OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS
Tactical COIN operations reduce the insurgent threat or activity in the area and provide a favorable environment for the host country’s development program. These purposes are complementary. When the insurgent threat is reduced, internal development can begin. When internal development works, the causes of dissatisfaction, which gave rise to the insurgency, are reduced. This deprives the insurgent of both popular support and a reason for fighting (which he needs to survive).

2-9. PLANNING
In COIN, the METT-T and political factors are considered in planning.

a. Mission. In mission analysis the commander considers the following elements.

(1) FIDAF operations include the following areas.
Joint-combined exercises
Intelligence operations
Population and resources control operations
Civil-military operations (including CA and PSYOP)
Humanitarian or civic assistance
Logistic support operations
Counter-drug operations
Tactical operations
Advisory assistance

(2) The brigade is most concerned with tactical operations. Due to the nature of counter guerrilla warfare, a specific tactical operation or campaign usually involves all elements of FIDAF.

(3) The commander’s guidance and subsequent planning are based on all probable missions. After the brigade receives the mission, the commander's guidance becomes more specific. This includes the extent to which the brigade becomes involved in each of the areas of FIDAF.

b. Enemy. When evaluating the insurgent abilities and limitations, the commander considers--

Ethnic origin and cultural history
Political organization, dogma, and goals
Strength, morale, and status of training
Tactics being employed and tactical proficiency
Ability to attack, defend, and reinforce
Resources available
Leaders and their personalities
Relationship with the civilian population
Status of supplies
Effectiveness of communications
Effectiveness of intelligence and counterintelligence
Lines of communications
Vulnerabilities
External support
Mine/countermine ability
Population control
Recruiting procedures
Tax collection

c. Terrain and Weather. When evaluating the effects of terrain and weather on COIN operations, the commander considers those factors normally considered on any operation along with--
(1) Effects of seasons of the year (to include planting and harvesting periods), phases of the moon, and coastal tides.
(2) Suitability of terrain (to include landing zones and pickup zones, ports, and airfields) and road networks for tactical and logistic operations.
(3) Urban areas that may be of vital importance. The commander evaluates the type and number of structures, and determines their effect on military operations. He should specifically consider the location of hospitals, utilities, police stations, military barracks, airfields, radio/TV stations, communications centers, bridges, tunnels, overpasses, and railroad tracks.

d. Troops and Resources Available. The commander has a variety of combat, CS, and CSS assets at his disposal. These assets may be from US forces and civilian agencies, from host country forces and civilian agencies, or from a combination of these. The circumstances of counter guerrilla warfare require that senior commanders allow subordinate leaders much flexibility in accomplishing their missions. Successful COIN operations depend on the commander using his available assets to maximize strengths and minimize weaknesses. To do so, the commander appraises the abilities and limitations of his assets. He organizes and employs them on suitable missions.

e. Time. Commanders at all levels must plan and prepare to execute contingency operations. When a contingency mission arises, the basic plan can be used as the basis for the detailed planning process. Routine tasks should be identified in SOPs and understood by all.
(1) Planning time may be limited. Warning orders and OPORDs may be issued orally. In these instances, the one-third, two-thirds rule applies: the commander uses one-third of the available time for his own planning and allows two-thirds of the available time for his subordinates to develop their plans and to issue their orders. Planning time can be so limited that the formal planning process may not be feasible. Therefore, commanders direct their subordinates by using FRAGOs. The ability to execute quickly, based on real-time intelligence, is critical to success.
(2) US forces involved in FIDAF operations should expect to stay in the host country only until the host country forces can assume missions the COIN force is accomplishing. No matter how successful the FIDAF, the insurgency is not defeated until the political, economic, and social problems are corrected or removed.

f. Political. The commander must face various political considerations. The military, normally working with the host nation's forces, supports US political objectives. Success is based on the achievement of those political objectives.
(1) US forces engaged in COIN operations function under restrictions not encountered in other types of warfare. Some of these restrictions are treaties, limitations on movement, and ROE. These