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Preface

“This is another type of war new in its intensity, ancient in its origins — war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him...it requires in those situations where we must counter it. ..a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training.”

John F. Kennedy, 1962

The aims, objectives, and methods of guerrilla warfare differ greatly from those of conventional warfare. To be successful in countering this type of war, the planners of counter guerrilla operations must understand the enemy and the unique environment in which he operates.

This manual provides commanders and staffs of brigade elements and below with concepts and doctrine concerning the conduct of counter guerrilla operations by US forces in insurgency and conventional conflict environments. It provides a general overview of US counterinsurgency strategy and the impact that strategy has on counter guerrilla operations. It provides planning, training, and operational guidance for commanders and staffs conducting counter guerrilla operations.

The doctrine provides principles to guide the actions of US forces conducting counter guerrilla operations. In applying these principles, the commander must be aware that the situation in each counter guerrilla operation is unique. Techniques and tactics applied successfully in one situation may not be suitable if applied in the same manner in another situation. The principles in this manual are guides to be adapted to each counter guerrilla situation.

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Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine gender is used, both men and women are included.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction**Section I. General****1-1. Overview.**

This chapter discusses the type of activity that is characteristic of an insurgency. A general overview of insurgency is provided to introduce the planner of counterinsurgency operations to the insurgent. The host government's method to defeat the insurgency is discussed, as is the difference between counterinsurgency and counterinsurgency operations. The methods of response by United States (US) forces, and the general doctrine for their use, are also presented.

1-2. Types of conflict.

- a. The risk to national survival is greatest in a conventional conflict, but the probability of such conflicts occurring is relatively low. On the other hand, the risk to national survival is not as great in a counterinsurgency conflict, but the probability of these types of conflicts occurring is much greater.
- b. Conventional conflicts imply a state of open belligerency between nations and a direct confrontation of their armed forces. An insurgency implies a situation where a country is threatened by an internal attempt, frequently assisted by external support, to overthrow the legitimate government. Counterinsurgency situations faced by US forces are likely to occur in an insurgency environment, but may also occur in conventional conflict environments. Counterinsurgency operations in support of a conventional conflict (such as the partisan operations that occurred behind German lines during World War II) are discussed in Chapter 4.

Section II. Insurgency**1-3. Concept.**

- a. The concept of resistance applies to an organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist, oppose, or overthrow the existing government. Many of the methods of resistance are part of the stock-in-trade of revolutionary activity. There can be **no revolution** without a resistance movement, but there can be a resistance movement without a revolution when the objectives of the resisters do not envision a reallocation of power.

- b. This concept applies to an organized insurgent movement that seeks to overthrow the established government. In this manner, an insurgent organization can be considered a type of resistance organization.

1-4. Prerequisites.

There are three requirements that must exist before an insurgency can occur.

- a. **Vulnerable population.** For whatever the reasons — social, political, or economic — the population is generally open to change. The insurgents will offer hope for change and exploit dissatisfaction with the current government.
- b. **Leadership available for direction.** A vulnerable population alone will “not support an insurgent movement. There must be a leadership element that can direct the frustrations of a dissatisfied populace along the lines delineated by the overall insurgent strategy.
- c. **Lack of government control.** Lack of government control may be real or perceived. The greater the control the government has over the situation, the less likely are the chances for insurgent success. The opposite is also true: the less control the government has, the greater is the chance for insurgent success.

1-5. Other required conditions.

There are a number of other conditions that must exist or be produced for an insurgent movement to succeed.

- a. **Popular support.** Support can be passive or active. It is not necessary that the entire population actively support an insurgency, but the majority of the population must passively support it.
- b. **Unity of effort.** The overall thrust of an insurgent movement must provide a strength of unity that dedicates those involved to achieving the same goal.
- c. **Will to resist.** It is not enough for the population to resist their government passively; at least a portion must be willing to resist actively.
- d. **Leadership.** The activities and effort of the insurgent movement must be properly directed through the exercise of effective leadership.
- e. **Discipline.** The aspect of the movement must be strongly maintained to ensure security and obedience.

- f. **Intelligence.** Because the insurgent movement is usually inferior in numbers and combat power in relation to government forces, the intelligence effort must provide security for the insurgent organization and information to conduct successful operations.
- g. **Propaganda.** It is used to gain popular support and intensify the populace's dissatisfaction with the government.
- h. **Favorable environment.** This includes attitudes of the people, the political environment, and the economic situation.
- i. **External support.** The preceding eight conditions are theoretically the only ones that an insurgency must have to succeed. Historically, however, there seems to be one additional condition that must exist the condition of external support. This support may be physical or psychological. Examples of physical external support are equipment, weapons, supplies, ammunition, sanctuaries, personnel, and combat units. Examples of psychological external support include the political support given to the resistance when a country recognizes that movement in the world arena and the pressure a government might exert politically or economically to influence world opinion in favor of the movement.

1-6. Insurgent organization.

An insurgent organization may have both an overt and a covert element. The overt element, the guerrilla, is readily identified. It is supported by a clandestine element which makes up the insurgent infrastructure. The insurgent organization also has political and military structures.

1-7. Phases of development.

- a. Once an insurgent organization is established and begins its activities, it progresses through several phases in its effort to overthrow the government. When the insurgency moves from one phase to another is difficult to determine. The activities that occur in the earlier phases will continue through the later phases. These phases range from the weak insurgent movement until the time the insurgent can confront government forces directly.
- b. There is also the possibility that an insurgency may move directly from Phase I to Phase III. Additionally, depending upon the lack of success of the movement, there may also be a reversion from Phase III to Phase II or even back to Phase I.
 - (1) **Phase I: Latent and incipient insurgency.** Activity in this phase ranges from subversive activity that is only a potential threat to situations in which frequent subversive

incidents and activities occur in an organized pattern. It involves no major outbreak of violence or uncontrolled insurgent activity. The guerrilla force does not conduct continuous operations but rather selected acts of terrorism.

- (2) **Phase II: Guerrilla warfare.** This phase is reached when the insurgent movement, having gained sufficient local or external support, initiates organized continuous guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the government. This is an attempt to force government forces into a defensive role. As the guerrilla becomes stronger, he begins to conduct larger operations.
 - (3) **Phase III: War of movement.** When the guerrilla attains the force structure and capability to directly engage government forces in decisive combat, then he will progressively begin to use more conventional tactics and may obtain combat forces from an external source. He may also begin to conduct more extensive defensive operations in this phase to protect the areas he controls.
- c. The goal of the insurgent movement, if achieved, will result in the replacement of the established government with a government structure developed by the insurgent movement. If this occurs, it is a political victory for the insurgents. The insurgent movement does not need to defeat host country forces to accomplish this. A parallel or "shadow" government may also be developed by an insurgent force. It must, however, win the support of the people away from the established government to achieve this political victory.

Section III. Counterinsurgency

1-8. Three target groups.

The government's weapon to combat insurgency is counterinsurgency (COIN). The COIN mission includes a full range of measures used by a government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. They are actions taken by a nation to promote its growth by building viable institutions (political, military, economic, social) that respond to the needs of the people. There are three target groups that the government addresses: the population, insurgents, and external actors.

1-9. Population.

The government must win back the support of the people. It does this through providing them security and showing an honest effort to correct those conditions which caused dissatisfaction.

1-10. Insurgents.

- a. The government must isolate the insurgent from the population, both physically and psychologically, thereby denying him personnel, materiel, and intelligence support.
- b. The COIN strategy is based on the concept of balanced development, mobilization, and neutralization. These three components are interdependent and must occur simultaneously. If COIN strategy achieves its goal, the government will regain populace support.
- c. The military assists the COIN program through the conduct of six major operations: intelligence, psychological operations, civil affairs, populace and resources control, advisory assistance, and tactical operations. The successful employment of these operations contributes to the success of the COIN program. They are normally conducted simultaneously, in conjunction with each other, and require close coordination of diverse government agencies.

1-11. External actors.

Current insurgencies target on *external actors* for support, passive or active. Both the government and the insurgents use this tactic. The insurgent tries to separate the government from its foreign support. The government seeks to retain its support and separate the insurgent from his foreign support.

1-12. Counterinsurgency — counterguerrilla.

There is a difference in the terms *counterinsurgency* and *counterguerrilla*. The internal defense and development (IDAD) program is geared to counter the whole insurgency. It does this through alleviating conditions which may cause insurgency. This program, which addresses both the populace and the insurgent, can be termed counterinsurgency. Counterguerrilla operations are geared to the active military element of the insurgent movement only. To this end, counterguerrilla operations are viewed as a supporting component of the counterinsurgency effort.

Section IV. Foreign Internal Defense

1-13. US assistance.

- a. All civil military action by a government to assist a host government and to achieve a standard level of protection from lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency is termed *foreign*

internal defense (FID). The United States (US) Army has been assigned a major role in providing military assistance to selected nations in support of US national interests. The degree of participation by US Army units is determined by US policy and interests, an analysis of the insurgent threat, and the capabilities and desires of the host country's government.

- b. The introduction of US combat forces into an insurgency to conduct counterinsurgency operations is something that is done when all other US and host country responses have been inadequate. US combat forces are never the first units into a country. They are normally the last. Preceding them is an array of advisors, security assistance forces, mobile training teams, combat service support units, and combat support units. Combat commanders deploying to conduct counterinsurgency operations should understand this and the fact that neutralization of the guerrilla is only one-third of the COIN strategy. Balanced development of the country and mobilization of the populace against the insurgents must occur simultaneously for the insurgency to be defeated.

1-14. US activities.

- a. When deployed in FID operations, US forces ensure that their planned activities support the goals and consequences of the host country's COIN program. Actions by US forces must not undermine or be detrimental to COIN goals.
- b. The response of US forces in any given situation must meet the following requirements:
 - (1) **Be appropriate** — response is appropriate to the level of threat and activity.
 - (2) **Be justifiable** — actions taken are justifiable in the eyes of the host country's population and the US public.
 - (3) **Use minimum force** — the goal is to restrict the use of force and the level of commitment to the minimum feasible to accomplish the mission. However, the principle of minimum necessary force does not always imply minimum necessary troops. A large number of men deployed at the right time may enable a commander to use less force than he might otherwise have done, or even to avoid using any force at all. Commanders must, however, keep in mind that a peaceful situation could become hostile because of the provocative display of an overlarge force. Doing too much may be a greater danger than doing too little.
 - (4) **Do maximum benefit** — US forces should select operations so they accomplish positive benefit for the population. If this

is not possible then the operational concept is wrong and should not be executed.

- (5) **Do minimum damage** – US forces ensure that operations preclude unnecessary damage to facilities, activities, and resources. Since this is almost an impossibility, compensation for any damage to property must be made and the property restored, as much as possible, to its original state. In any case, a major consideration is to plan activities to limit damage.

Section V. AirLand Battle and Counter guerrilla Operations

1-15. Challenges.

AirLand Battle is the Army's operational concept for combat. It is designed to deal with the worldwide challenges the Army faces. The four basic challenges to the Army are the battlefield, leadership, readiness, and training. The basic concepts of AirLand Battle doctrine can be applied to counter guerrilla operations.

1-16. The battlefield.

The Army faces an enemy that may strike from any direction. It must contend not only with military considerations in this environment but with the political, economic, and social considerations which may oftentimes outweigh military considerations. The Army must be able to operate in all geographical areas and climates, and on all types of terrain, with only the weapons, tactics, and assets permitted by the political, social, and economic environment. The enemy will strike at weak points and seek to avoid direct combat.

1-17. Leadership.

The complexities of counter guerrilla operations place a premium on informed and trained leadership and independent operations. These conditions demand more leader expertise and the ability to operate independently at lower command levels than do higher levels of conflict. The leader applies skill, imagination, and flexibility. He effectively leads his troops and helps them to understand the problems of counter guerrilla operations. He must be willing to reorganize his assets to better accomplish his mission.

1-18. Readiness.

Units tasked to conduct counter guerrilla operations are prepared to deploy and operate on short notice. Each soldier is prepared for battle

and is able to perform his duties. Units train to operate in areas of the world where they may be tasked to fight.

1-19. Training.

- a. Training is the cornerstone for success and a full-time job for commanders. The commander ensures that soldiers are proficient in traditional, basic skills and also familiar with more complex skills required for success in a counterinsurgency environment. These skills include intelligence, civil affairs, populace and resources control, psychological operations, and advisory assistance.
- b. AirLand Battle concepts outline the principles the Army must apply when engaged in combat. Combat operations based on this doctrine seek to locate, harass, and neutralize the guerrilla force and deny it the capability to conduct offensive actions by severing its linkage with the population. Coordinated efforts of military and civilian organizations are required to achieve the overall objective.

1-20. Operational concepts for AirLand Battle.

- a. Generally, the purpose of military operations is to defeat the opposing force. The use of armed forces in a counterinsurgency role is primarily to provide enough internal security to enable the host country to initiate counterinsurgency programs and pursue national objectives.
- b. The final resolution will not be by military means, but by political, social, and economic action. With this in mind, successful military operations are a means to an end. Success in combat depends on the basic tenets of AirLand Battle doctrine: initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization.
 - (1) **Initiative.** To preserve the initiative, subordinates act independently within the context of the overall plan. The overall attitude of the Army is one of action, not reaction, to the enemy's initiatives. The characteristics of improvisation, initiative, and aggressiveness, tempered with intelligent and prudent decision-making, must be strong.
 - (2) **Depth.** This refers to time, distance, and resources. The commander is able to operate over large areas with minimum logistical support while retaining the ability to react to unexpected attacks. This battle-in-depth is designed to delay, disrupt, or destroy the guerrilla's uncommitted forces and base areas. Reserves are kept to a minimum to allow maximum use of the force, while still retaining the capability to meet most threats.

- (3) **Agility.** This requires flexible organizations and leaders who can quickly adapt to changing situations. The factors of mission, enemy, terrain (and weather), troops (available), and time (available) (METT-T) and the way they interface with environmental considerations determine the type of organization involved. The leader is innovative and flexible, and he adapts to different situations. Mobility enhances the agility of the force engaged in counter guerrilla operations, but the force is not tied to its vehicles. At a minimum, the force has mobility equal to that of the guerrillas.
- (4) **Synchronization.** This means more than coordinated action to achieve maximum combat power. In the counter guerrilla environment, it encompasses the effective, coordinated use of available combat power and its interface with noncombat operations. Tactical and nontactical, civilian and military, host country and US force operations are coordinated and supportive of each other to achieve the overall objective. Additionally, US military operations are aligned with US policy and aims in the host country. This in turn may place certain restrictions on US forces.

1-21. Combat imperatives.

- a. The seven combat imperatives of AirLand Battle doctrine find their basis in the principles of war. These imperatives are:
 - (1) **Ensure unity of effort.** The principles for this imperative are the objective, unity of command, and simplicity. Unity of effort requires the commander to understand the overall US objective and how his operations support that objective. He applies the principles underlying this imperative in such a way that the effects of his operations are not a detriment to attaining the overall US objective.
 - (2) **Direct friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses.** The principles for this imperative are maneuver and surprise. The commander minimizes and protects his weaknesses and uses his strengths against the guerrilla's weak points. To do this, he knows the enemy's organization, equipment, and tactics. In addition to knowing how the guerrilla fights, it is important for the commander to understand why the guerrilla fights.
 - (3) **Designate and sustain the main effort.** The principles for this imperative are mass and economy of force. The Army cannot be everywhere at once. It cannot do everything at once. Priorities are set at tactical and operational levels to determine where the main effort is to occur and what goal is to be achieved.

- (4) **Sustain the fight.** The force may have to operate for extended periods on limited logistics. To sustain momentum, the commander deploys forces in adequate depth and arranges for service support when needed. The commander is audacious and presses soldiers and systems to the limits of endurance.
 - (5) **Move fast, strike hard, and finish rapidly.** The principles for this imperative are maneuver and mass. Speed and mobility are essential. To avoid detection, US forces employ deception techniques, communications security (COMSEC), and operations security (OPSEC). While the overall conflict may be prolonged, the tactical operations are executed with speed to retain initiative and freedom of action. This is balanced against the need for patience.
 - (6) **Use terrain and weather.** The guerrilla force is familiar with the terrain and comfortable with the climate. Reconnaissance and intelligence (if accomplished effectively) give the commander a decisive edge in anticipating difficulties with terrain and weather. He uses both to his advantage.
 - (7) **Protect the force.** Successful commanders preserve the strength of their force. They do so through security, keeping troops healthy and equipment ready, and by sustaining discipline and morale. The guerrilla seeks to degrade the morale of the force through the use of psychological operations (PSYOPS) and harassment. His tactics are geared to wear down his opponent's will to fight. The commander trains his soldiers and constantly reminds them of exactly what the mission is and why it is important to complete the mission.
- b. Doctrine is a guide that delineates principles and fundamental concepts. The commander uses these principles and concepts when analyzing the situation and then uses them as a guide in selecting his actions.

CHAPTER 2

The Threat

Section I. General

2-1. Operations.

- a. The guerrilla must be understood before he can be defeated. This chapter discusses the characteristics, tactics, and environment of guerrilla operations.
- b. The guerrilla is the overt combat element of the insurgent organization. The members of the guerrilla force are organized under military concepts to conduct military and paramilitary operations. Their duties usually include all the overt actions that are conducted by the insurgent organization but may include covert and clandestine operations. They are usually most active in insurgent-controlled or contested areas. However, when the insurgency calls for operations in government-controlled areas, the guerrilla may conduct these operations.

2-2. Aims and goals.

- a. **Support overall goal of the insurgent movement.** To this end, the guerrilla operates to support the major goal of the insurgent movement to replace the established government.
- b. **Gain support for insurgent movement.** The guerrilla tries to gain support for the insurgent movement through propaganda, coercion, and terror. If he cannot gain active support, then he will seek passive support: Silence on the part of the populace concerning insurgent activities is considered passive support for the insurgent.
- c. **Increase population's vulnerability.** Through the use of selective terrorism, the guerrilla attacks or destroys economic and political symbols upon which the government is founded. Overreaction on the part of government forces or other elements of authority contributes to the population's dissatisfaction with the government and its subsequent support to the insurgency.
- d. **Lessen government control.** By defeating small government forces and striking where government forces are not, the guerrilla adds to the perception that the government cannot or will not provide security for the population and its property. This adds to the perception that the government cannot control the insurgents.
- e. **Provide psychological victories.** To this end, the guerrilla seeks to gain victories that psychologically benefit the insurgent